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We study water regulation for a schematic water economy repre-
senting a wide range of real world situations. A water policy has inter-
and intra-temporal components. The ¯rst determines the limits on
extractions from the naturally replenished sources, given the stochas-
tic nature of recharge processes associated with uncertain precipitation.
The intra-temporal regulation is concerned mainly with the allocating
of the extracted and produced water among the end-users. The prices
that implement the optimal intra-temporal allocation are derived. Reg-
ulation issues associated with cost recovery and asymmetric information
are discussed.
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Population growth and rising living standards have led to a rapid increase
in the demand for water. As the quantity of renewable fresh water available
for use in any particular location is on average constant and water conveyance
is an expensive operation, water has become scarce in many parts of the world.
Adding the prevalence of deteriorating water quality and the increased aware-
ness for water-related environmental and social problems helps to understand
why water regulation has become a critical policy challenge. The goals of a
water policy entail e±cient use of the existing sources and a balanced plan-
ning and development of new sources. As most economically viable, natural
sources have already been developed, prospects for augmented water supply
increasingly rely on secondary sources such as recycled and desalinated water.
This work presents the basic principles of regulating a water economy.
Water economies vary with respect to physical and social properties, and a
successful policy must be tailored to the particular conditions of the case under
consideration. Our focus here is on those principles shared by many water
policies, in spite of the idiosyncrasies of the water economy to which they are
applied.
The water economy is described in Section 2. In Section 3 we de¯ne
feasible and optimal water policies. A water policy has inter- and intra-
temporal components. The ¯rst determines the limits on extractions from
the naturally replenished sources, given the °uctuating nature of recharge
processes due to stochastic precipitation. The intra-temporal regulation is
concerned with the allocation of the extracted and produced water among
the end-users and allocation of the supply infrastructure (capital). Section
14 speci¯es the water prices that implement the intra-temporal allocation. It
highlights an interesting ¯nding that the optimal water price of a particular
user should not be a®ected by the cost of water that will never be demanded
by that user (e.g., the price of irrigation water should not be a®ected by the
cost of desalination). Section 5 discusses regulation issues associated with
cost recovery and asymmetric information. Section 6 remarks on a variety of
frequently encountered issues that lead to departure from the optimal pricing
of Section 4. The appendix contains technical details and derivations.
We note at the outset that this e®ort does not pertain to survey the wide
range of water regulation issues and no attempt is made to cover the huge
literature on this topic. Our aim is to lay out the important principles of
water regulation in a concise and coherent fashion and in a way that can be
used in actual implementation.
2 The water economy
A water economy consists of (i) the physical resource base (precipitation,
rivers, lakes, aquifers), (ii) consumers and users (irrigators, households, indus-
try), (iii) suppliers and the associated infrastructure (extraction-conveyance-
treatment infrastructure), and (iv) regulatory and institutional infrastructure
(water laws and property rights, prices and quotas, water institutions). We
begin with a schematic description of these components.
2.1 Water resources
There are M (possibly interconnected) naturally replenished water sources














t ; m = 1;2;:::;M; (2.1)
where Rm(¢) represents deterministic recharge, xm
t is stochastic recharge and
gm
t is the rate of extraction from source m.
Recharge at time t emanates from current precipitation and from subsur-
face °ows. The latter depends on current and past precipitation. Precipi-
tation may vary spatially across the basin. Accordingly, we divide the basin
into N ¸ 1 subregions and denote by wt = (w1
t;w2
t;:::;wN
t ) the precipita-
tion in the N subregions during period t. The wt's are i.i.d. draws from an
N-dimensional distribution Fw de¯ned over a nonnegative support.




t ) according to
xt+1 = wt+1¤ + xt¡; (2.2)
where ¤ and ¡ are, respectively, N £ M and M £ M matrices of (known)
coe±cients. The m'th column of ¤ represents the immediate e®ect of precip-
itation on the m'th stock recharge, while the m'th column of ¡ represent the
(diminishing) e®ects of past precipitation. In view of (2.2), the water stocks
evolution (2.1) can be rendered as
Qt+1 = Qt + R(Qt) + xt¡ + wt+1¤ ¡ gt; (2.3)




Two types of produced sources may also be available: desalinated water
(of brackish sources or seawater) and recycled (treated sewage) water. We
refer to desalination as source M + h; h = 1;2;:::;H, where H is the number
of desalination plants.
3Recycled water has two distinctive features that separate it from the other
sources. First, exogenous (health and environmental) regulations often require
treating sewage water, disregarding whether it will later be reused. Second,
the same regulations often forbid mixing treated sewage water with water from
the other sources, implying that reusing the treated water requires separate
conveyance and distribution systems. These properties a®ect the pricing of
recycled water, discussed below.
2.2 Consumers and users
The basin contains S private sectors (urban, agriculture, industry) and a
few public sectors (parks, estuaries, wilderness areas) scattered spatially in
L locations (districts, regions, municipalities). We consider a single public
sector, called the environment (e.g., instream water), indexed S + 1.1 The
inverse water demand for sector s = 1;2;:::;S; in location l = 1;2;:::;L; is
denoted Dsl(¢): when the water price ($ per m3, say) is Dsl(q), sector s in
location l demands the water quantity q. We assume stationary water de-
mands; extensions needed to account for non-stationary e®ects (e.g., economic
and demographic growth) will be discussed in the concluding section.
2.2.1 Agricultural (irrigation) demand
The number of agricultural sectors depends on the level of aggregation and
may contain, for example, orchards, vegetables, ¯ber (cotton), cereals, other
¯eld crops and livestock. Agricultural sector s in location l has J activities
(crops), indexed j = 1;2;:::;J. Let yj(q) denote crop j's water-yield value
1Water allocated to the environment has features of a public good, hence the analysis of
this sector di®ers from that of the S private sectors.
4function (not including the water cost).2 The corresponding inverse demand
for irrigation water is given by y0
j(¢) ´ @yj(¢)=@q. To see this note that
when the price of water is pw, pro¯t is yj(q) ¡ pwq and the water input that
maximizes pro¯t satis¯es y0
j(q) = pw. Thus, the water demand at that price
is y
0¡1
j (pw). Typically, yj(¢) is increasing and strictly concave, so that y0
j(¢) is
decreasing and its inverse exists. The water demand of agricultural sector s




j (pw) and the corresponding inverse demand is
Dsl(¢) = q
¡1
sl (¢). The diminishing marginal productivity of water implies that
Dsl(¢) is decreasing (see details in Tsur et al. 2004, Tsur 2005).
2.2.2 Industrial demand
Industrial sectors contain non-agricultural production activities that use
water as an input of production. As above, the number of industrial sectors
depends on the level of aggregation and the sectors are de¯ned according to
the role and use of water in the production process. The inverse water demand
of industrial sector s in location l, Dsl(¢), is derived in the same way as the
agricultural water demand, with industrial activities instead of agricultural
activities (see Renzetti 2002a, for a detailed analysis).
2.2.3 Residential demand
The utility of household i depends on the per-capita consumption of water
(~ q) and other goods (~ z). The (per-member) demands for ~ q and ~ z are the
2These functions are de¯ned as follows: Let ~ yj(q;b;z) denote crop j production function,
where q is water input, b is a vector of ¯xed inputs (e.g., land and family labor) and z is
a vector of purchased inputs (labor, fertilizers, pesticides, machinery) with price vector r.
Then, yj(q) = maxzfpj~ y(q;z;b)¡rzg s:t: b · ¹ b, where the output price pj, the ¯xed inputs




ui(~ q; ~ z) s:t: (pw~ q + pz~ z)ni · yi; (2.4)
where yi is the household's income, ni is the household's size (number of mem-
bers) and (pw;pz) are the prices of (~ q; ~ z). Household i's (per capita) water
demand is denoted ~ qi(pw;pz;yi;ni) and the residential water demand in loca-





and the corresponding inverse water demand is Dsl(¢) = q
¡1
sl (¢). The residen-
tial sector includes water use for human needs (including water consumed in
service, public and commercial institutions) and private gardening (water use
in public urban parks is included in the environmental sector, discussed below,
due to its public-good feature). With some added complication, it is possi-
ble to consider private gardens as an additional residential sector (detailed
accounts can be found in Baumann et al. 1998, Renzetti 2002b).
2.2.4 Environmental demand
Environmental sectors include irrigation water of public urban parks and
instream water in wilderness areas and estuaries. They di®er from the sectors
discussed above due to their public good features. We brie°y outline how to in-
corporate environmental water, assuming for simplicity a single environmental
sector indicated as sector E or S+1 interchangeably. Let q²El ´ q²S+1l repre-
sent allocation of environmental water in location l. Household's i demand for
q²El is measured in terms of the household's willingness to pay (WTP) to pre-
serve q²El against the alternative in which q²El = 0 and the environmental wa-
ter allocations in all other locations, qE
¡l ´ (q²E1;q²E2;:::;q²El¡1;q²El+1;:::;q²EL),
6are unchanged. Suppose that the utility household i derives from qE ´
(qE
¡l;q²El) is represented by the additive term uE
i (qE), which is added to
vi(pw;pz;yi;ni) of (2.4). Household i's WTP for q²El when environmental
water allocation is qE, denoted WTP l












Estimating households WTP for environmental water belongs to the gen-
eral area of valuing natural amenities, on which a large (and growing) body of
literature exists (see Freeman 2003, Bockstael and McConnell 2007, for recent
contributions).
2.2.5 Consumers (users) surplus
The gross surplus (not including the water cost) sector s in location l






sl(®)d®; s = 1;2;:::;S; l = 1;2;:::;L: (2.6)
Since Dsl(¢) is positive and decreasing, Bsl(¢) is increasing and strictly concave.
The surplus generated by qEl is the sum of the WTP l
i(qE) over all households











E); l = 1;2;:::;L












Water supply entails extraction-production, conveyance, treatment and
distribution. Each activity requires capital, labor, energy and material in-
7puts. The capital cost constitutes the bulk of the ¯xed cost (some labor
costs, such as management and accounting, may also be independent of the
water supply rate, hence included in the ¯xed cost), while the costs of the
other inputs make up the variable cost. We discuss each in turn.
2.3.1 Capital cost
The capital stock of each activity is measured in terms of the full cost of
installing the infrastructure (pipes, pumps, canals etc.) necessary to carry out
the activity. The notation used for the various capital stocks is presented in
Table 1. A capital stock determines the capacity of the associated supply
activity, i.e., the maximal quantity of water that can be supplied during a
year, but otherwise has no e®ect on the water supply rate. We denote these
capacity functions by F(¢) with the same subscripts and superscripts as those
of the associated capital stock. For example, F m
e (k) is the maximal annual
amount of water that can be extracted from source m when Km
e = k.








des ´ F M+h
e Desalination plant h = 1;2;:::;H
Kc Fc Basin-wide conveyance
Kml
c F ml
c Conveyance from m 2 Jl to l
Kl
tr F l
tr Treatment, location l
Ksl
d F sl
d Distribution in l to s
Kl
sew F l
sew Sewage, location l
Ksl
rec F sl
rec Recycling to s 2 Jrec in l
Water treatment may occur (i) at the source (upon extraction, before con-
veyance), (ii) in conjunction with basin-wide conveyance or (iii) upon reaching
location l. Regarding (i), at-the-source treatment occurs in conjunction with
8extraction and the extraction capital includes in-source treatment capital as
well. Likewise, basin-wide treatment is carried out in conjunction with basin-
wide conveyance and Kc includes also the treatment capital. Treatment in
location l can be carried out centrally for all sectors, using capital Kl
tr, or
separately for each sector, in which case the distribution capital Ksl
d includes
treatment capital as well. Which design is more cost-e®ective depends on the
nature of the location. For example, locations that are predominately urban
may prefer central treatment to a drinking quality, whereas locations that are
predominately agricultural may prefer separate treatment systems for urban
and agricultural users.
Water is conveyed from source m to location l in one of two ways: either
directly, using the infrastructure Kml
c designated solely for that purpose, or
via the basin-wide conveyance facility Kc. We denote by Jl the set of sources
that can supply water directly to location l: if m 2 Jl then water from m to
l is conveyed via Kml
c ; if m = 2 Jl, then water from m to l is conveyed via the
basin-wide conveyance facility Kc if location l has access to Kc. Notice that
Kml
c can be used only to deliver water from m to l. If a conveyance facility
serves more then one source-location (ml) combination, it is included in Kc.3
Some locations may not have access to Kc and can receive water only from
sources m 2 Jl. We denote by Jc the set of locations that have access (are
connected) to the basin-wide conveyance facility Kc.
Sewage activity refers to the mandatory collection and treatment of water
from urban and industrial sectors, disregarding whether the treated water will
be reused later on. We denote by Jsew the set of sectors that are connected to
3In general more than one conveyance systems deliver water to multiple source-location
combinations. Here we assume a single Kc system. Allowing for multiple Kc systems will
add details but change none of the results.
9the sewage system. Typically the sewage infrastructure in location l (Kl
sew)
serves all sectors connected to the sewage system, i.e., all s 2 Jsew, hence is not
sector-speci¯c (the variable costs of sewage treatment do vary across sectors {
see Table 2 below).
Recycling is the voluntary activity of reusing the treated sewage water,
which requires further treatment, conveyance and distribution to end-users.
Some sectors (e.g., residential) are not allowed to use recycled water and we
let Jrec represent the set of all sectors that can use recycled water. Because
recycled water cannot be mixed with drinking water, it requires a distribution
system of its own. The recycling infrastructure, Ksl
rec, includes treatment,
conveyance and distribution facility.
The annual cost of capital is the interest and depreciation on the (current-
value) capital stock, which constitutes the bulk of the ¯xed cost of water
supply. For example, with r and ± representing the interest and depreciation
rates, respectively, the annual capital cost associated with extraction from
source m is (r + ±)Km
e .
2.3.2 Variable cost
The variable costs of supply are due to energy, labor and material inputs.
They are listed in Table 2. Supplying a m3 per year to sector s 2 Jsew in



























For m = 2 Jl and l 2 Jc, Cc replaces Cml
c , and Csl
sew = 0 for s = 2 Jsew. The
variable cost of supplying a m3 per year from desalination plant h to sector s
10Table 2: Variable costs
Notation Variable cost of (activity)
Cm
e Extraction (and possibly treating), source m = 1;2;:::;M
Cdes ´ CM+h
e Desalination, plant h = 1;2;:::;H
Cml
c Conveyance from source m 2 Jl to location l
Cc Basin-wide conveyance: relevant for conveyance from m = 2 Jl to l
Cl
tr Treatment before distribution in location l
Csl
d Distribution (and possibly treatment) in location l to sector s
Csl
sew Sewage collection and treatment, sector s 2 Jsew in location l
Csl
rec Recycling: treating, conveying & distributing to sector s 2 Jrec location l
in location l is
C
M+h
e (a) + C
M+h;l
c (a) + C
sl
d (a) + C
sl
sew(a);
with the obvious modi¯cations if M +h = 2 Jl or s = 2 Jsew. The current state of
desalination technology leaves ample room for cost reduction due to technical
change (see Tsur and Zemel 2000).
Because mixing recycled with water derived from the other M +H sources
is not allowed, recycled water requires conveyance and distribution systems
of its own, which are included in the recycled capital Ksl
rec (Table 1). The




The regulator, or water authority, oversees and implements the water policy
de¯ned next.
113 Water policy
At the beginning of year t, after the precipitation wt, hence recharge xt, has
been realized, the water state Zt = (Qt;xt) is observed. Given (Zt), the policy
decisions for year t entail: (i) extraction quotas gm
t ; m = 1;2;:::;M; for the
M naturally replenished sources; (ii) allocation of the extracted and produced
(desalinated and recycled) water among the end users; and (iii) investment in
the capital infrastructure that determines the capacity of the various supply
activities.
The extraction allotments gm; m = 1;2;:::;M, should be determined
within an intertemporal decision framework that accounts for hydrological
considerations associated with sustaining the water sources in the long run
given the stochastic nature of precipitation and the ensuing recharge processes.
We seek a decision rule that to any feasible realizations of the water state Zt
assigns a feasible extraction quotas (see formulation in Appendix B). The
existing literature follows the pioneering work of Burt (1964) and includes the
works of Tsur (1990), Tsur and Graham-Tomasi (1991), Provencher and Burt
(1994) and Knapp and Olson (1995). This area is still under-explored and
the present e®ort does not change this state-of-a®airs. Our focus here is on
(ii) and (iii).
3.1 Water allocation
An annual (intratemporal) water allocation is de¯ned in terms of qmsl: the
amount of water to be supplied from source m to sector s in location l, m =
1;2;:::;M +H +1, s = 1;2;:::;S +1 and l = 1;2;:::;L, where m = M +H +1
represents the recycling source and s = S + 1 is the environment sector. An



















































M+H+1sl (total recycled water): (3.1g)
3.2 Capital decisions
The analysis pertains to a mature water economy for which the capital in-
frastructure has already reached some kind of a steady state. By this we mean
that the bulk of the infrastructure development has already been carried out
and the intra-temporal capital decisions entail replacement of the depreciated
capital and possibly some incremental investment to meet a growing demand.
The capital decisions entail the investment rates in any of the capital stocks
listed in Table 1.
3.3 Feasible allocation
An intratemporal water allocation is feasible if all the qmsl are nonnegative,










e );m = 1;2;:::;M + H (extraction-production capacity);
(3.2b)






c ) for m 2 J

























rec); s 2 J
rec;8l (recycled to sl capacity) (3.2h)
and





sew (total recycling); (3.2i)
where ®rec is the fraction of water loss due to sewage treatment and recycling.
Feasible capital investments are nonnegative and cannot exceed some ex-
ogenous bounds (a®ordable expenditures):
Kt ¡ Kt¡1(1 ¡ ±) ¸ 0 (irreversible capital); (3.2j)
and
Kt ¡ Kt¡1(1 ¡ ±) · ¹ I (a®ordable investment); (3.2k)
where ± is the depreciation rate and ¹ I is the exogenous upper bound on in-
vestment. Constraints (3.2j)-(3.2k) apply to each capital stock in Table 1.
143.4 Optimal allocation














































































recycled water to s 2 Jrec in l
(3.4)











































Net annual bene¯t equals the aggregate surplus minus the variable cost mi-
nus the capital cost. The optimal allocation is the feasible allocation that
maximizes the net annual bene¯t.
The capital cost (3.5) ought to be explained. Recall that we consider a
mature water economy { one in which the capital infrastructure has already
reached a steady state (with a possible growth trend). Therefore, the cost of a
capital stock K (which represents the full cost of installing the infrastructure)
consists of the cost of ¯nancing K, i.e. the interest payment rK, plus the
replacement cost ±K due to depreciation.
154 Optimal pricing
We characterize the water prices that implement the optimal allocation
for the private sectors s = 1;2:::;S, assuming the environmental allocations
qmS+1l ´ qmEl; m = 1;2;:::;M +H+1; l = 1;2;:::;L; are given.4 Derivations
and technical details are presented in Appendix A. Sector s in location l
constitutes an end user, called user sl. There are S £ L such users. The
water price user sl faces is speci¯ed in terms of intermediate prices associated
with extraction and desalination, conveyance, distribution-treatment in each
location and sewage collection-treatment. We discuss each in turn.
4.1 Extraction-production
The extracting ¯rms pay (the regulator) an abstraction fee for each water
unit (m3) pumped from a naturally-replenished source. This charge, denoted
¢m, varies across the M sources and represents the scarcity of water at that
source. ¢m = 0 if gm ¸ F m
e (Km
e ), i.e., if the the extraction quota is not
binding; otherwise it is determined such that extraction from source m =
1;2;:::;M does not exceed the quota gm. No scarcity rent is imposed on
desalination (for all practical purposes, the sea is an unlimited water source),
so ¢M+h = 0 for h = 1;2;:::;H.










; m = 1;2;:::;M + H; (4.1)
where cm
e ´ Cm0
e (qm²²) is the marginal cost of extraction (production) from
source m and fm
e ´ F m0
e (Km
e ) is the marginal product of extraction (produc-
tion) capital at source m, i.e., the increase in the extraction capacity associated
4Due to the public good nature of environmental water, its allocation cannot use pricing
and will not be further discussed here.
16with a marginal (unit) increase in the extraction capital (all derivatives are
evaluated at the optimal water and capital allocation).
The (r + ±)=fm
e term in equation (4.1) is the marginal cost of extraction
(production) capital per unit water. To see this note that, when source m's
extraction capacity constraint is binding, fm
e is the increase in water extraction
associated with a marginal (unit) increment in the extraction capital Km
e .
Thus, 1=fm
e is the incremental capital per unit water, which when multiplied
by (r + ±) gives the annual cost of the incremental capital per unit water.
4.2 Conveyance
The intermediate conveyance price is the marginal cost of conveying water











c ) if m 2 Jl ; l = 1;2;:::;L; m = 1;2;:::;M+H;
(4.2)
where cc ´ C0
c(qc); cml
c ´ Cml0
c (qm²l), fc ´ F 0
c(Kc) and fml
c ´ F ml0
c (Kml
c ) (all
derivatives evaluated at the optimal allocation). Note that if m = 2 Jl (i.e.,
no facility is solely designated to convey water from m to l) and l = 2 Jc (i.e.,
l has no access to the basin-wide conveyance facility), then it is impossible to
convey water from m to l and pml
c does not exist.
4.3 Treatment and distribution in location l
Upon reaching location l the water is treated and distributed to the various
























tr ´ F l0
tr(Kl
tr) (all
derivatives evaluated at the optimal allocation). The ¯rst and second terms
on the right-hand side of (4.3) represent the marginal cost of distribution to
sector s in location l and may include also treatment costs if water is treated
separately for sector s. The third and fourth terms represent cost of treatment
before the water enters the distribution system. In locations that do not
perform central treatment, the last two terms vanish.
4.4 Sewage
The prices considered so far are associated with supplying water from the
various sources to end-users. The sewage of some sectors, i.e., s 2 Jsew (urban
and industrial sectors), must be collected and treated. The marginal cost of









for s 2 J
sew and 8l; (4.4)
psl
sew = 0 for s = 2 Jsew, where csl
sew ´ Csl0
sew(q²sl) and fl




Recycling occurs when the treated sewage water is delivered to user sl,
which often entails further treatment to the quality required by the receiving









for s 2 J








We turn now to formulate the optimal end-user prices. To that end, let Isl
be the set of all water sources aside from recycling for which qmsl > 0 under
18the optimal allocation:
I
sl = fm 2 f1;2;:::;M + Hgjq
msl > 0g: (4.6)
It is easy to detect the exclusion of a particular source from Isl. Let
^ p
sl ´ D
sl(0); s = 1;2;:::;S; l = 1;2;:::;L; (4.7)
represent the maximal water price below which sector s in location l (i.e., user
sl) demands a positive amount of water (this is the price user sl will pay for
the ¯rst water unit). Then, qmsl = 0 when the water price of source m is equal
to or exceeds ^ psl, implying that m = 2 Isl. The ^ psl of the urban sectors are
much higher than those of the agricultural sectors, and those of the industrial
sectors are typically in between.
The Isl sets of some urban sectors contain all sources (otherwise, the ex-
cluded sources will never be demanded and should not be included in the list
of water sources), while those of the agricultural sectors typically contain sub-
sets of the M +H sources, e.g., the desalination sources will be excluded from
the Isl of most agricultural sectors in most locations. Let Msl indicate the
number of sources included in Isl, so Msl · M + H with equality holding for
















represent the average marginal cost of supplying water to user sl, averaged
over the M + H sources (excluding recycling) from which user sl demands
water (i.e., over the sources included in Isl). We are now ready to state the
main result:
19Property: The optimal S £L end-user prices of water derived from sources
m = 1;2;:::;M + H are
p





sew; s = 1:::;S; l = 1;:::;L: (4.9)
The property implies that the end user prices psl are not directly a®ected
by the cost of water derived from sources that are irrelevant to user sl, i.e.,
excluded from the Isl set. For example, the cost of desalination should not
directly a®ect the price of irrigation water in agriculture sectors for which
^ psl · pM+h
e + pM+hl
c ; h = 1;2;:::;H (which is the case in Israel for all agri-
cultural sectors). However, the desalination price will a®ect the price of
irrigation water indirectly via its a®ect on water scarcity. A higher desali-
nation cost reduces the scale of desalination, thereby increasing the scarcity
prices, ¢m; m = 1;2;:::;M, of the natural water sources.
As recycled water (m = M+H+1) uses separate treatment and conveyance
facilities, it is priced separately of water derived from the other M+H sources.









sew are de¯ned in (4.5) and (4.4), respectively.
4.7 Supply stages and intermediate prices
The supply process can be viewed as proceeding along the following stages:




t ), determined by the regulator. Alternatively, the regulator
can charge the extraction fees ¢m; m = 1;2;:::;M, determined such that the
extraction ¯rms will not extract beyond the extraction quotas. The extracted
20(produced) water is \sold" to the conveyance ¯rms at the price pm
e . The












²sl; l = 1;2;:::;L; (4.11)
where ¹ psl, q²²l and q²sl are de¯ned in (4.8), (3.1b) and (3.1e), respectively.5
Location l's water authority, then, treats and distributes the water to end
users in its location, and collects and treats the sewage, charging end-users
the price psl. We summarize the intermediate prices associated with each
stage in Table 3.
Table 3: Water prices along the supply stages
Price Received by Payed by
¢m Regulator Source m's extraction ¯rm
pm
e Source m's extraction ¯rm Conveyance ¯rms
pl
c Conveyance ¯rms Location l's water authority
psl Location l's water authority User sl
5 Regulation
The regulator's task at the beginning of year t entails (a) ensuring that




(see Appendix B on the optimal gt) and (b) allocating the overall extracted
and produced water among the end users. The policy tools available to the
regulator are prices and quotas. The pros and cons of prices vs. quotas have











The second sum is used to cover cost of treatment, distribution and sewage collection in the
location. The ¯rst sum is used to \buy" the water quantity q²²l from the conveyance ¯rms,
which is the same as buying that quantity at the price pl
c.
21been shown by Weitzman (1974) to depend on the balance between (i) the
underlying uncertainty or asymmetric information and (ii) the elasticity of
demand and supply. A thorough investigation of this issue in the context of
water regulation is beyond the present scope.
At the beginning of period t (after the precipitation has been realized),
the regulator knows (calculates) gt (see Appendix B) and can accomplish task
(a) by setting the quotas gt on extractions from the M natural source. Alter-
natively, the regulator can set the extraction charges (also known as scarcity
rents or user cost) ¢m such that the extracting ¯rms will ¯nd it undesirable
to extract beyond the gm quotas. Setting these charges appropriately (not
too high and not too low) requires knowledge of the water demand supply
relations, on which the regulator rarely has full information. Regulating ex-
tractions solely by the extraction charges ¢m is therefore not recommended.
A third alternative is a combination of quotas and low extraction charges: the
quotas ensure that extractions do not exceed the limits gt and the proceeds
from the extraction charges can be used to cover various regulation expenses.
The remaining of this section deals with regulation task (b).
5.1 Allocation regulation
The optimal prices de¯ned above are evaluated at the optimal allocation,
where end-user demands and supply costs intersect. Calculating these prices
in actual practice requires information on the demands of all end-users and all
supply costs. This information is rarely available to water authorities. The
regulation task, it turns out, is greatly simpli¯ed under the special case of
constant returns to scale supply technologies. We begin with this special
case.
225.1.1 Linear prices
Suppose that the capacity and variable cost functions listed in Tables 1
and 2 are of the form C(a) = ca and F(K) = fK. Thus, the marginal cost
c equals the average cost independent of the supply rate, and the marginal
capacity f equals water supply per unit capital independent of the capital
stock. In this case, the intermediate and end-user prices are independent of
the supply rates and can be determined without recourse to water demands
nor to the optimal allocation. Moreover, the water proceeds exactly cover the
full cost (variable and ¯xed) of water supply.
How does the regulator ¯nd out the true average costs, i.e., the c's and f's
of the various C(¢) and F(¢) functions? Often the information available to
the regulator comes from activity reports (e.g., balance sheets) of the water
supply ¯rms, giving rise to myriad of agency problems.6 The literature o®ers
a variety of methods to overcome or mitigate such problems (see La®ont and
Tirole 1986, 1993, for relevant contributions). For example, by setting a
price cap based on observed (reported) average costs with a period of gradual
reduction to a target (lower) price. Firms that outperform the curve (i.e.,
become e±cient faster) can keep the extra pro¯ts, while ¯rms that trail the
curve will be replaced. When feasible, auctions should be used to choose the
operating ¯rms. For example, the choice of a desalination ¯rm, or the ¯rm to
build and operate an irrigation project.
6The ¯rms, knowing that their reported information may be used against them (i.e., to
determine e±cient prices) are likely to misrepresent true costs.
235.1.2 Linear prices as second-best regulation
The pervasiveness of scale economies in water supply technologies renders
unlikely the linearity of the cost and capacity functions . In such cases the
average costs di®er from the marginal costs and both vary with the water allo-
cation. The task of calculating the optimal prices, then, requires information
on the water demands of all end users and the supply costs of all supply ¯rms
and quickly becomes intractable. Moreover, aside from the information issue,
under the optimal, marginal cost prices the water proceeds do not cover the
full cost of supply. Imposing the constraint that the water proceeds cover the
supply cost, then, implies departure from the optimal, marginal cost pricing
rule. The Ramsey rule (Ramsey 1927) speci¯es a departure that maximizes
aggregate consumer surpluses subject to balanced supply budgets (see, e.g.,
Wilson 1993, Chapter 5). This rule requires information on the demand elas-
ticities of all sectors. Lacking this information, the regulator may resort to a
simple average cost pricing, by setting the c's and f's of the various prices at
the associated average costs. This simple average cost pricing rule balances
the supply budgets but is suboptimal to the Ramsey pricing rule. Given the
information limitation, it is viewed as second-best pricing.
5.1.3 Decentralized regulation
The pricing problems discussed above stem from the so-called asymmetric
information { when consumers and suppliers have private information that
they may not disclose (see Smith and Tsur 1997, Tsur 2000, for water related
discussions). Decentralization, namely delegating decisions to consumers and
suppliers, is often an e®ective way to overcome or mitigate such problems.
Water markets are (extreme) examples of decentralized mechanisms. Trad-
24ing can be in water, in water rights or in water quotas, it may be formal or
informal and it can be carried out within and between sectors (e.g., irrigation
associations and urban districts) as well as within and between time periods.
The wide range of observed market designs stem from the wide range of in-
stitutional, hydrological and physical setting a®ecting the operation of water
markets (see Easter et al. 1998, 1999, Dudley 1999, Zilberman and Schoengold
2005, 2007, and references they cite). They all serve to alleviate problems
associated with asymmetric information.
6 Concluding remarks
The above is a bare-bones account of basic principles of water regulation.
In actual practice one encounters a myriad of problems that lead to departure
from these basic principles and require special considerations. The asymmetric
information problem has been discussed in Section 5. We remark on a few
additional, frequently encountered, issues.
Subsistence water Water for basic needs (drinking, cooking, hygiene) is
considered by many as a human right to which all are entitled, disregarding
economic considerations such as supply costs and households' budget con-
straints. The manifestation of this view in actual practice is via block-rate
pricing of urban water, with a low (or even zero) price for the subsistence block
(see Gleick 1996, for basic water needs).
Implementation costs The prices formulated above are volumetric and re-
quire metered water or some other way to infer the volume of water consumed.
Volumetric pricing entails implementation costs, associated with installing and
25maintaining water meters, monitoring water use and collecting fees. These
costs are high relative to other pricing methods (wich may explain why world-
wide the bulk of irrigation water is unmetered { see Bos and Wolters 1990).
When implementation costs are included in the welfare calculations, other
pricing methods, such as area pricing, may outperform volumetric prices (see
Tsur and Dinar 1997, for some examples in the case of irrigation water).
Water laws and institutions Water laws, ownership rights and water in-
stitutions determine the toolkit available for policymaking and often limit the
use of prices and quotas in implementing a water policy (Rausser and Zusman
1991, Zusman 1997, Saleth and Dinar 2004, Gri±n 2006, among many others).
These constraints, when added to the feasibility constraints imposed on the
water allocation problem, could lead to substantially di®erent policies.
Nonstationary demand Water demands increase in time due to demo-
graphic and economic growth. On the supply side, the recharge processes of
the natural sources m = 1;2;:::;M, although °uctuating from year to year,
are stationary (up to possible long-run trends associated with climate change).
Driven by the hydrological base and the stationary recharge processes, the ex-
traction quotas gt = (g1
t;g2
t;:::;gM
t ) from the M natural sources cannot grow
beyond certain limits. Eventually, the growing demand will have to be met
by produced (desalinated and recycled) water. Water-abundant or sparsely-
populated regions do not need the produced sources (at least not in the near
term). But many water-scarce or densely-populated regions already need
these sources and the number of such regions increases every year.
26Private sectors with public good features Water used in some private
sectors may also have public-good e®ects. Examples include landscape ameni-
ties of irrigated farmland and private urban gardens (McConnell 1989, Drake
1992). Fleischer and Tsur (2009) showed that the landscape amenity of a par-
ticular (irrigated) agricultural sector s (a crop or a group of crops) increases
the value of marginal product of land, hence also of water, for this sector. In
such cases, the social water demand (that accounts for the external landscape
e®ects) lies above the private water demand Dsl(¢), de¯ned in subsection 2.2.1.
The optimal water prices for this sector should be determined according to the
social demand schedule rather than the private schedule Dsl(¢) and the ensuing
optimal allocation entails more water to sector s compared with the allocation
based on the private demand Dsl(¢). Such e®ects may justify subsidizing ir-
rigation water for certain agricultural sectors, e.g., by setting a lower price up
to a certain quantity of water (i.e., a form of block-rate pricing).
General equilibrium considerations Our analysis is of a partial equilib-
rium type in that we assume that the rest of the economy is exogenous to the
water economy. For example, we take perimetrically the price of capital (the
interest rate r). Often, the water economy constitutes a substantial part of
the entire economy, to the extent that the water policy may have feedback
e®ects with a number of economy-wide variables, such as the price of capital
and labor. In such cases economy-wide considerations can have signi¯cant
rami¯cations on water regulation (see e.g. Tsur et al. 2004, Diao et al. 2008).
27Appendix
A Derivation of the optimal prices
Environmental water allocations are assumed exogenous and set at zero for















































































































subject to the feasibility constraints (3.2), exogenous constraints regarding
water quality (a®ecting treatment requirement and recycled water allocation)
and nonnegativity of the water allocations, given the previous year capital
stocks (the sub-aggregate allocations are speci¯ed in (3.1)).
Notice that, given the previous year capital stocks, the capital decisions
entail only this year investments. Notice also that it cannot be optimal to plan
idle capacity in any of the capital stocks (since it increases the cost without




t ) vary from year to year, based on the precipitation realization
28and the extraction capital stocks Km
e ; m = 1;2;:::;M, are set according to
some average allotment vector ¹ g and the other capital stocks are determined
accordingly (with no idle capital).7 We solve (A.1) for an average year in
which gt = ¹ g, so (3.2b) are binding and (3.2a) represents the same constraints
as (3.2b), hence can be ignored. We also assume that (3.2j)-(3.2k) are non-
binding.






c(qc) if m = 2 Jl and l 2 Jc
Cml0
c (qm²l) if m 2 Jl (A.2)
(Recall that Jl is the set of sources from which water is delivered directly to
location l via the infrastructure Kml
c . If location l receives water from a source
m = 2 Jl it is done via the basin-wide conveyance infrastructure Kc, provided l














rec(qM+H+1sl) if s 2 Jrec
0 otherwise
: (A.4)
In general, lower-case c(¢) indicates the marginal cost (derivative) of the corre-
sponding cost function C(¢) and lower-case f(¢) stands for the marginal prod-
uct (derivative) of the corresponding capacity function F(¢). ¹m
e is the shadow
price of (3.2b), ¹ml
c is the shadow price of (3.2c) or (3.2d) for fm = 2 Jl and l 2
Jcg or fm 2 Jl and 8lg, respectively; ¹l
tr is the shadow price of (3.2e); ¹sl
d is
the shadow price of (3.2f); ¹l
sew is the shadow price of (3.2g); and ¹sl
rec; s 2 Jrec;
is the shadow price of (3.2h). We assume that (3.2i) is not binding.
7The optimal ¹ g according to which the extraction capital stocks are determined must be
speci¯ed within an intertemporal decision problem and will not be pursued here.






























· 0; m = 1;2;:::;M + H; 8(s;l) (A.5)
equality holding if qmsl > 0, where ¹sl
sew = ¹l
sew or 0 for s 2 Jsew or s = 2 Jsew,











rec · 0; s 2 J
rec; (A.6)









if (3.2b) is binding, ¹m










c ) if m 2 Jl and (3.2d) is binding
; (A.8)
¹ml
c = 0 if (3.2c) or (3.2d) are not binding (recall that if m = 2 Jl and l = 2 Jc
then no water can be delivered from m to l and ¹ml









if (3.2e) is binding, ¹l









if (3.2f) is binding, ¹sl


















rec) if s 2 Jrec and (3.2h) is binding
0 otherwise
: (A.12)
30No slack capital under the optimal allocation implies binding capacity con-






























c ) if m 2 Jl ; (A.13b)





































sew); s 2 Jsew
0 otherwise
(A.13d)














for s 2 J
rec (A.13e)
as in (4.5).
With Isl as the set of all water sources m for which qmsl > 0 under the
optimal allocation, (A.5) holds as equality for all m 2 Isl. Summing (A.5)
over all m 2 Isl and dividing by Msl (the number of sources in Isl) gives
D






where ¹ psl is de¯ned in (4.8). Noting that, evaluated at the optimal allocation,
Dsl is the optimal water price for sector s in location l, veri¯es 4.9.
















sew s 2 J
rec;
verifying (4.10), noting that the left-had side is the demand price when a
positive amount of recycled water is consumed.
31B On the optimal extraction quotas
The water state at period t is represented by
Zt ´ (Qt;xt); (B.1)
where Qt and xt are, respectively, the water stocks and recharge, de¯ned in
(2.2) and (2.3). Let f(Z0jZ;g) denote the state's transition density, i.e., the
pdf of Zt+1, conditional on Zt = Z and gt = g, evaluated at Z0 = (Q0;x0).
From (2.2)-(2.3) we obtain
f(Z
0jZ;g) = fw¤(Q
0 ¡ Q ¡ R(Q) + g ¡ x¡)I(x
0 = w¤ + x¡) (B.2)
where I(¢) is the indicator function that assumes the values 1 when its argu-
ment is true and 0 otherwise, and fw¤(¢) is the pdf of w¤ induced by Fw.
Denote by B(Zt;gt) the annual net bene¯t at year t characterized above,
where gt is the vector of M extraction quotas during year t and Zt is the state
vector, de¯ned in (B.1). Given the initial state Z0 = (Q0;x0), the precipitation
series fwtgt=1;2;::: generates fxtgt=1;2::: via (2.2), which together with the policy





where ¯ 2 (0;1) is a constant discount factor.
Given Z0 = Z, the value function, v(Z), is the maximal expected payo®











where Et signi¯es expectation conditional on information available at time t












32where A(Z) is the set of feasible extractions at water state Z and f is the
transition density de¯ned in (B.2).
A Markov extraction policy g(Z) is a rule assigning a feasible g to any fea-
sible state Z. The optimal policy g¤(Z) is the extraction rule that maximizes
the right-hand side of (B.4). An important line of research entails studying the
properties of the optimal extraction policy, such as existence and uniqueness
of g¤(¢) as well as convergence of the optimal state process to a steady state
distribution under various recharge processes, water demand forms and supply
technologies (Puterman 2005, is a good resource for this task).
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